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? The work on the successive Polish National Development Plan beyond 2006 must start now. 
The plan must be fundamentally different from the current document – the National Development Plan 
for 2004/2006. First of all, it must cover a longer time span and focus on domestic development 
objectives and circumstances. While it should take into account the evolving EU cohesion policy, it 
must nevertheless stem from consideration given to Polish strategic interests. It should give a much 
stronger support to the development of advanced economy and entrepreneurship. It should be based on a 
domestic structural economic transformation strategy as well as a domestic regional development 
policy. 
 
? The intellectual approach to the issue of the EU funds must change. The experience of EU 
member-states shows that it is not as important what percentage of the funds is spent (which is what the 
Polish government is concentrating on) as whether they are spent sensibly - and this should be the focus 
of planners and decision-makers. 
 
? We believe that the system of managing programs financed under the Structural Funds beyond 
2006 must be decentralized and simplified. Also, 16 and not just one regional development operating 
program should be established and provincial authorities should be granted wider executive powers. 
 
? The organizing and legislative work must be maximally intensified up to May 2004, i.e. the 
date on which Poland joins the European Union, so as to best utilize the EU funds granted for 
2004/2006. Changes are particularly needed in the system of public finances because without them 
territorial authorities and the private sector will have difficulties co-financing development programs. 
The work on IT and financial spending control systems must be accelerated, administration training 
must be expanded and made more flexible, and fund beneficiaries must be better assisted in preparing 
good investment projects. 
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In 2004/2006, Poland has an opportunity to get financial support to the tune of some 
€11.3 billion within the framework of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund1. The 
experience of those EU countries that benefit from EU assistance shows that it is very 
hard to spend all the money granted. However, we must stress that it is not the 
proportion of the money spent that matters most. Much more important is its sensible 
spending, focused on making an actual contribution to structural changes and economic 
development of Poland.  
 
There is a general tendency to look at the use of European resources as a balance of what 
is paid into and what is gotten out of the EU budget. The threat of Poland being a net 
payer has forced Polish politicians to attempt changing the image of their role in 
accession negotiations. At the same time, that threat affects the way Poland is being 
prepared for the absorption of EU resources. A focus is put on quantity rather than 
quality. It is, therefore, worth recalling that Greece's problems did not occur because of 
the insufficient utilization of available assistance funds but because of poor investment 
decisions.  
 
A wise utilization of the Structural Funds is conditioned, among other things, by a 
proper preparation of planning documents and investment projects, development of an 
effective fund management and monitoring system, and re-shaping of the system of 
public finances with a view to accumulating sufficient project co-financing resources. 
Still, the most important is a change in the way of thinking about the Structural Funds.  
 
National Development Plan or a list of EU fund expenses? 
 
The National Development Plan (NDP) is the strategic blueprint for planning domestic 
and European activities in 2004/2006. This document has several significant limitations. 
The main one is that, as strategic plans go, its time span of two years is rather short. It is a 
consequence of the EU budget cycle and the date of Poland joining the EU. While we 
have no influence over that, the Polish government did have influence over the second 
limitation –making the National Development Plan strictly dependant on EU 
investments. A program document of this magnitude should present a cohesive vision of 
Poland's strategic objectives, particularly those achieved with domestic money. It should 
not depend solely on European funds and, consequently, on the EU vision of priorities in 
our country's development.  
 
Similarly to other candidate countries, Poland experiences peculiar developmental 
circumstances and problems which result from its communist legacy and incomplete 
economic transformations, and which must be taken into particular consideration when 
drawing up strategic plans. Otherwise these plans will end up serving for not much more 
as a backing to applications for EU money.  
 
The adopted NDP development structure was reflected in its preparation process.  
European Commission officials had much more impact on its content than Polish 
communities with whom its draft was consulted. A delay in its preparation (it was 
initially slated for completion by the end of 2001) made it necessary to embark on the 
development of several planning documents at once, such as operating programs and so-
                                                     
1 Narodowy Plan Rozwoju 2004-2006 (National Development Plan for 2004/2006), Ministry of Economy, 
January 2003.   
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called supplements to operating programs. They should have been developed in 
sequence rather than parallel. This caused a great deal of misunderstandings and 
additional work, and also complicated the process of public consultation. 
 
It is not the way toward knowledge-based economy 
 
The main objective of NDP lies in the development of a competitive knowledge-based 
economy and entrepreneurship. This highly desired direction of the development of 
Polish economy should funnel the NDP spending into the development of 
entrepreneurship, introduction of new technologies into Polish economy and investment 
in human resources.  
 
Meanwhile, a careful study of the National Development Plan shows that close to 60% of 
available funds will be spent on the development of basic infrastructure, mainly roads 
and environmental protection solutions. Only a dozen or so percent were earmarked for 
entrepreneurship support, including only up to 9% for the introduction of advanced 
technologies. Investment in infrastructure is less troublesome for the public 
administration than investment in innovation programs, and so it is safe to say that, 
indeed, Poland will use up a great deal of EU resources. However, as shown by 
experience gained in other parts of the world, the impact of such investments on 
economic development is limited. Investment in production based on high technology is 
much more effective.  
 
 
Absence of stimuli for entrepreneurship development 
 
We will be able to speak of an effective utilization of the EU funds only when they 
stimulate local economic network resources. Meanwhile, however, it can be expected that 
large infrastructure development contracts will be won by more competitive EU 
enterprises. Already today, most contracts on such projects conducted within the 
framework of PHARE programs are won by large EU companies.  
 
Another problem lies in the absence of a comprehensive approach to economic 
development. Since the document in question focuses on spending the EU funds, it lacks 
domestic small and medium-size enterprise assistance programs. It makes no reference to 
instruments that stimulate entrepreneurship (investment allowances, tax rate reductions, 
credit guarantees, regional loan funds, etc.). There is also no indication of sources that 
would stimulate domestic investment in the National Development Plan. After all, a 
country's development cannot rely solely on foreign savings. 
 
In the draft of the National Development Plan, some 22% of the funds have been 
assigned to the development of human resources. They are earmarked primarily for 
fighting unemployment, especially among social groups particularly disadvantaged on 
the labor market. As a result, most jobs thus created will be poorly paid and low-skilled. 
At the same time, only about 5% of the funds are earmarked for professional 
development of personnel involved in advanced branches of the economy. Studies show 
that these jobs are precisely the ones that generate the highest developmental stimuli.  
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Overly sectoral arrangement of priorities 
 
Another problem lies in an overly sectoral arrangement of priorities and execution 
directions. Since the Polish government is chronically incapable of coordinating 
implementation measures, this will undoubtedly lead to the application of poorly 
coordinated sectoral schemes. Therefore, the effect on development will be surely 
moderate – degraded by the absence of synergy, organizational difficulties and 
competition for influence between various administrative institutions. The document 
provides a very blurry description of the extent to which sectoral schemes and the 
regional development operating program will complement one another.  
 
The amount of resources earmarked for the coverage of project preparation costs is 
astonishingly low in comparison to other expenses. Document authors seem to assume 
either a very high efficiency of project handling services and a large number of projects 
ready for execution or count on the beneficiaries' willingness to engage extremely high 
sums into project preparation activities. Both assumptions are totally unrealistic. 
 
 
Work on the next National Development Plan must begin now! 
 
Considering everything that has been said up to this point, there is a need to start the 
planning work on the successive National Development Plan beyond 2006 as early as 
possible. The new NDP must be fundamentally different from its predecessor. First of all, 
it must cover a longer time span and stress domestic objectives and developmental 
circumstances. It must provide a much stronger support to the development of advanced 
economy and entrepreneurship. It should be founded on a domestic strategy of structural 
economic transformations and domestic regional development policy. While it should 
take into account the evolving EU cohesion policy, it must nevertheless stem from 
consideration given to Polish strategic interests.    
  
Centralized fund management system causes problems 
 
When discussing the institutional system responsible for spending resources out of the 
Structural Funds, it needs to be pointed out that 70% of these funds will be managed by 
individual ministries. In six out of seven operating programs, the entire planning and 
implementation process will be handled by government administration.  
 
Centralizing management procedures will not necessarily improve the effectiveness of 
spending EU fund resources. This is associated with an overly sectoral approach to 
investment programs and, consequently, lack of coordination at the central government 
level and non-inclusion of local factors in investment planning. In addition, centralized 
management in Poland carries with itself a gamut of organizational and political 
problems, which further complicate the effectiveness  of investment endeavors.  
 
The climate which accompanies centralization of pre-accession programs in Poland is 
well illustrated by the organizational disarray among agencies implementing the Phare 
Economic and Social Cohesion Program. There is no coordination between individual 
projects nor is their implementation based on strategically selected priorities. Frequent 
organizational changes are not thought over or consulted properly, and good ideas are 
put in the same bag as totally inappropriate ones. Their implementation logistics is 
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limping. In effect, there are serious organizational problems, delays in the execution of 
individual projects and a growing doubt as to the usefulness of the entire endeavor.  
 
 
Organizational structure of the Integrated Regional Development Operating Program 
is too complicated 
 
A special role in spending resources out of the Structural Funds will be reserved for the 
Integrated Regional Development Operating Program (IRDOP). Compared to other 
programs, it will be executed with the strongest participation of local self-governments. 
However, the Ministry of Economy will continue to play a key role. A fundamental 
impact on centralization of the discussed system was exerted by a decision to establish 
one (instead of 16) regional development operating program managed precisely by the 
ministry responsible for regional development.  
 
As a result of adopted organizational procedures, provincial governors will play a more 
important role in regional development. They will perform principal program 
management functions at the provincial level, oversee the overall program execution 
process and participate in the transfer of financial resources from the EU and state 
budget. Since the provincial governor will have a dominating position in the IRDOP 
management, he will probably have a significant influence on decisions taken by steering 
committees, hence on project selection. As for the provincial self-government, it will 
collect projects and maintain a database of applications for project co-financing out of the 
Structural Funds. It will also lead the planning work within regional steering committees.  
 
The adopted organizational structure of the discussed program is extraordinarily 
complicated and may give rise to political tension, thus decreasing the effectiveness of 
fund resource spending. This is an outcome of two conflicting trends present during the 
program development phase. On one hand, efforts were made to include territorial self-
governments, particularly provincial self-governments vying for position, in the 
organizational structure, while on the other there was an attempt to satisfy the state 
administration's aspiration to have as much influence as possible on financial and 
substantive decisions.  
 
 
Best solutions for the utilization of EU resources in 2004/2006 
 
 
What can and must be done right away? How to best use the time before Poland 
joins the EU in May 2004? What follows is an analysis of various aspects of the system for 
handling EU fund resources in 2004/2006 which is currently under development and a 
presentation of recommendations. 
 
The system of public finances must change 
 
The current organization of the Polish system of public finances hinders the long-term 
planning of structural fund commitments and expenditures as well as domestic co-
financing of projects. The system of public finances does not guarantee that the planned 
amounts will be actually allocated into the implementation of objectives of the National 
Development Plan for the next few years. There is a need for legislative changes, 
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particularly for a directive of the Ministers' Council on how to monitor, assess and 
reporting on projects and programs financed out of the EU funds. 
  
It is also necessary to change the structure of public spending, mainly by transferring a 
portion of earmarked resources to territorial self-governments. Let us remember that the 
current government has suggested such solutions in its electoral program. The draft of 
the reform of public finances drawn up by Deputy Premier Kołodko calls for a larger 
share of income tax revenues going to territorial self-governments in exchange for 
elimination of state subsidies. This may not be sufficient to ensure a domestic co-
financing of EU investments.  
 
The smallest administrative units (gmina) are considered better prepared to absorb 
resources than other territorial self-governments. Contrary to districts and provinces, 
they have their own resources to execute investment projects. However, their potential 
involvement in EU projects will depend on the adjustment of current investment plans 
and reduction of certain current expenses. It should be remembered that the territorial 
self-government share in co-financing projects executed with the assistance of the 
Structural Funds is estimated at close to EURO 1 billion.  
 
One should bear in mind the cost of project preparation (feasibility studies, 
environmental assessments, land purchase, technical and construction designs) as well as 
the need to contract commercial credits for certain EU projects. This may be a problem, 
particularly in case of gminas, which operate on very small budgets. In turn, large towns 
and metropolitan agglomerations are heavily indebted, which may also seriously limit 
their investment capabilities. Those reserves that territorial self-governments had in the 
form of communal property have been severely depleted. Consequently, it seems that a 
proper level of financing structural projects will need to rely on public money. Some 
groups suggest raising the statutory self-government indebtedness ceiling from 60% to 
70% of annual revenues, but that is not a good solution.  
 
Finance Ministry officials have offered PLN 6 billion in state guarantees to co-financing 
projects executed with the assistance of the EU funds. In addition, the central 
government plans to set aside a special reserve to subsidize certain local self-government 
projects, particularly in case of those self-governments that find themselves in a dire 
financial situation.  
 
Such initiatives are extremely necessary. However, they must be worked out in every 
detail and appropriate criteria must be developed for granting public assistance to EU-
backed projects. The application of public aid instruments should go hand in hand with 
restructuring provincial contracts so as to maximize investments that are of a truly pro-
development nature and, at the same time, provide for domestic co-financing of EU 
projects. In addition, government plans should include the proposal to set aside a fund 
reserve earmarked for technical costs of preparing project documentation. Furthermore, a 
comprehensive solution must be found to the issue of improving the system of public 
finances, including its real rather than feigned decentralization. The most important is to 
raise the amount of investment funds available to provincial self-governments.  
 
The central government must also find additional sources of domestic financing of NDP 
investments. Permitting Open Investment Funds to engage resources in NDP programs 
is one good solution. The program of repairing public finances must include investment 
in Polish enterprises and territorial self-governments. 
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There must be more support of entrepreneurship 
 
The central government expects entrepreneurs to contribute close to EURO 2 billion to 
EU project co-financing. This may turn out to be overly optimistic, the more so since 
financial institutions are not sufficiently interested in crediting such investments.  
 
More than 90% of Polish businesses are small, employing nine people or less. Excessive 
dispersal of enterprises with insufficient equity, credit that is difficult to get and very 
expensive, as well as hold-ups in payments down the contractor chain do not favor 
investment and innovation financing. Let us remember that the current investment 
indicator is the lowest in 12 years and that 90% of Polish companies invest in 
development only out of their profits.  
 
Phare pre-accession programs are an interesting example of entrepreneurship support 
with the EU funds. This refers especially to the development of small and medium-size 
enterprises (SME) under the Phare Economic and Social Cohesion Program. Several 
factors are responsible for the difficulties experienced by that program, particularly in 
provinces located along the so-called "eastern wall". First of all, entrepreneurship in those 
areas is very poorly developed. One can hardly expect these frail businesses to have 
sufficient resources in equity or commercial credits to be able to make significant 
investments into co-financing EU projects. Consequently, a serious drawback of that 
Phare program rested in the unavailability of a preferential corporate loan granting 
system. Moreover, in most provinces in eastern Poland commercial financial institutions 
are few and those that exist are relatively weak. Consequently, they do not constitute a 
suitable base for the Phare program.  
 
There is an urgent need to establish financial instruments that will assist entrepreneurs in 
their participation in EU programs, particularly credits granted on preferential terms by 
state banks such as Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego or PKO BP. Also, there should be 
more support for provincial financial institutions – investment funds, credit guarantee 
funds, etc. Moreover, regional development agencies should be closer linked to 
provincial self-governments. A possible scenario would be to transfer central 
government entrepreneurship development funds to regional self-governments and then 
have them managed by these agencies. 
 
 
Training of UE fund management personnel must be accelerated and improved 
 
There is a need for administrative backing that would be able to handle the burden of 
managing EU fund absorption. The Polish civil service system is very poorly developed. 
There is very little training of public servants in handling challenges associated with 
absorption of the EU funds. An additional problem rests in the low wages paid to civil 
servants, which make experienced specialists leave the administration. It should be 
expected that after Poland joins the EU even more personnel will leave the Polish civil 
service for EU institutions. Training that is offered is often ill adapted to the needs. All 
these problems apply equally to the situation within the central government and local 
administration.  
 
The central government is planning to add some 600 positions to state institutions which 
handle the EU funds and makes approximately PLN 11.5 million available for hiring new 
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civil servants. However, the price of hiring additional personnel on the provincial level 
will have to be paid by provincial self-governments. The central government is also 
planning to reorganize central and provincial administration institutions and carry out a 
civil service training campaign for provincial marshal's office personnel and future EU 
fund beneficiaries. 
 
Make up for delays in the application of a computerized monitoring system 
 
The Computerized Monitoring and Control System (CMCS) must be operational one year 
prior to the absorption of the Structural Funds. Its development has fallen considerably 
behind the government schedule. The principal cause for this lies in the absence of 
coordination and proper inter-ministerial collaboration. Individual ministries have also 
fallen behind schedule in the development of their own systems of monitoring, assessing 
and controlling operating programs and structural funds. The absence of legislation 
governing such systems is an additional problem.  
 
 
Absence of good investment projects 
 
The Ministry of Economy has set up a database of potential projects that could be 
developed within the framework of IRDOP and the Cohesion Fund. The database 
contains projects registered with provincial marshal's offices. So far, some 600 projects 
have been entered into the database, but the Ministry of Economy believes that only one 
third has been properly prepared. Potential beneficiaries of the EU fund assistance must 
deal with the additional problem of not knowing the ultimate shape of the National 
Development Plan. For example, they still do not know what information will be 
required in the structural fund subsidy application. This hinders the project preparation 
work of territorial self-government units. 
 
At the same time, the central government shows no inventiveness as concerns 
streamlining the project preparation process, for example with respect to simplifying 
certain investment regulations (such as issuing building permits), creating a fund to 
subsidize documentation development costs, changing long-term planning regulations, 
etc.  
 
From the viewpoint of ensuring an appropriate absorption of the EU funds, the main 
problem lies in the preparation of high-quality investment projects. Project development 
requires not only time (sometimes even more than a year), documentation preparation 
resources (even as much as 5% of the project value) and administrative skills. For a 
project to be valuable, it must be based on a good idea.  
 
An examination of the submitted projects shows that many potential beneficiaries lack 
administrative imagination and long-term planning skills. In particular, there is a 
deficiency of sequential thinking abilities and development objective selection skills. 
Local strategies, often developed just for show, are not helpful in specifying 
developmental priorities. The practice of filling out Phare project applications shows that 
what counts more is the wish to spend the EU funds for whatever purpose rather than 
use them sensibly and to the benefit of the local interests. This is why a successful 
application of the Structural Funds depends before all else on changing this way of 
thinking both among central government decision-makers and regional and local 
politicians.  
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*** 
 
Organizational and legislative changes suggested herein must be implemented before 
May 2004. At the same time, the work on preparing a system for handling the EU funds 
in 2007-2013 must be started as quickly as possible. Before all else, there is a need to 
decentralize and simplify the program management system, including the establishment 
of 16 regional development operating programs rather than only one.  
 
The work on the successive plan for Poland's development beyond 2006 must begin as 
soon as possible. This plan must be fundamentally different from its predecessor. It must 
give much more support to the development of advanced economy and entrepreneurship. 
It ought to be based on a domestic strategy of structural economic transformations and a 
domestic regional development policy. While the plan should take into consideration the 
evolving EU cohesion policy, it must nevertheless stem from consideration given to Polish 
strategic interests.    
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